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PURCHASE OF SHARES OF A CORPORATION BY A
DIRECTOR FROM A SHAREHOLDER.

AS

SUGGESTED by the title to this paper, a discussion of the
relationship between the directors of a corp9ration and the
corporate entity is not within its scope. Neither is the relationship
between the directors-and the entire body of the shareholders. These
two subjects ilrc generally treated in another branch of the law of
corporations and generally are not governed by the same rules of
law. 1 The purchase of share~ of stock by a director from a nonofficial shareholder naturally brings into question the relationship between the director and the shareholder in his individual capacity, and
not in his capacity as. the representative of the corporation or the
entire body of the shareholders. 2
This same subject was the title of a paper which was published
in. tlie MrcnrGAN LAW ~£VIEW for 1910. 3 In that article, all the
d,ecisions upon the subject were reviewed and conclusions drawn
from them by the author. In 1910, the weight of judicial decision
had undoubtedly established the mle that a director in purchasing
the shares of stock of a non-official shareholder was bound by no
duty to the shareholder t!'.> disclose any facts relative to the condition
or future prospects of the corporation, even though those facts might
have had an important bearing on the then present value of the
stock. And if the sale was conducted without actual fraud on the
P.art of the director, that is, without misrepresentation or active concealment, the sale could not be set aside, nor could the director be
held to account to the shareholder for the profits resulting from a
rise in the value of the stock immediately subsequent to the sale!
1
Walsh v. Goulden, 130 Mich. 53r., 539: "Directors, of course, stand in
a fiduciary relation to the corporation itself. They do not stand in that relation, however, when dealing with other stockholders for the purchase or sale
of stock," Cf. Crowell v. Jackson, 53 N. J. L. 656, 657.
'Dodge v. Woolsey. 18 How. 331, where a shar-eholder was allowed to
maintain an action against the directors as representative of the entire body
of the shareholders and the corporation.
I

8
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•Grant v. Attrill, II Fed. 469; Gillett v. Bowen, 23 Fed. 625; Hooker v.
Midland Steel and Iron Company, 215 Ill. 444; Board of Commissioners of
Tippecanoe Count)r v. Reynolds, 44 Ind. 509;· In re Shreveport Bank, u8 La.
664.; Walsh v. ·Gotdden, 130 Mich. 531; Crowell v. Jackson, 53 N. J. I •. 656;
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There are frequent expressions in the older decisions such as, "a
director * * * may deal with an individual shareholder and purchase his stock practically on the same terms as a stranger,"~ and,
"the directors are not the bailees, the factors, agents, or trustees of
such individual stockho}ders."0
The almost universal adoption of this rule so broad in terms, has
brought down a storm of protest from the writers in the periodicals,
who proclaim· it to be contrary to the dictates of ethics and sound
morals.' It has been urged by others that to continue the rule would
be contrary to sound business policy. 8 And it would seem to be
perfectly obvious that if the directors were allowed to manipulate
the affairs of their corporation in such a manner as to discourage the
small investor and then purchase his shares at a nominal price,that, if they are allowed to make such purchases with impunity and
without fear of avoidance of the sale, then the small investor will
ultimately be forbidden to invest in the stock of corporations. The
ultimate success of the corporate fonn of business enterprise lies in
making the corporation a reasonably safe place for investment,-at
least secure from the passive frauds of its officers and directors.
'!'his necessarily involves the abrogation of the old rule,-~£ not in
toto, at least in some of the more extreme cases.
Such an extreme case presented itself to the Supreme C.ourt of
the United States in 1909. Strong v. Repide9 was correctly predicted
by the author of the former article in the MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
to be a leading case upon the relation of director to non-official
shareholder iil the purchase of the latter's shares of stock. The
court in that case admitted the existence of the general rule that the
director iQ purchasing the shares of a shareholder owes to him no
duty to disclose the condition of the c~rporate. affairs. However,
Justice Peckham, in speaking for the court, announcea for the first
Carpenter Y. Danforth, S'-"' Barb. 581; Stark v. SoulC, 2'J N. Y. Week. Dig. 8o;
Krumbhaar v. Griffeths, 151 Penn. St. 223; Deaderick v. Wilson, 8 Baxt.
(Tenn.) 1o8; Haarstick v. Fox, 9 Utah uo; O'Neile v. Ternes, J2 Wash.
528; Percival v. Wright, [1902] 2 Ch. 421.
1
Hooker v. Midland Steel and Iron Compi,tly, 215 Ill. 444•Smith v. Hurd, 12 Met. 371,-per Chief Justice Shaw.
1
67 D:NTRAJ. L. JOURNAL, 452.
I 81 CtNTRAL L. JOURNAL, 256.
•Strong v. Repide, 213 U. S. 419. For a full discussion of the facts and
holding in this ca,se, see 8 'MICH. L. Rtv. 268. ·
.
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time the so-called special facts doctrine, that where there are special
facts connected with the sale of the stock, the case may be taken out
of the general rule and a duty devolve upon the director to make a
full and accurate disclosure to the shareholder of all facts within
his knowledge which have a bearing upon the real value of the stock.
It may be well, in this connection, to enumerate the special facts
which took Strong v. Repide out of the general rule and rendered the
purchasing director liable to the shareholder for the profit resulting
from the transaction: (I) The director owned a majority of the
stock of the corporation, ( 2) He was the chief negotiator in the sale
of the company's lands to the government, which sale was the sole
cause of the difference between the real and the apparent value of
the stock of the corporation at the time of the transaction, (3) 'l'he
negotiations were for the sale of the entire property of the corporation, (4) Through the acquiescence of the s~reholders, he was acting substantially as their agent in the sale of their stock, (SJ He
concealed his identity as purchaser from the shareholder, (6) The
nature of the corporation itself, as pointed out in a recent case,1° was
also an important circumstance which contributed to the result
reached in Strong v. Repide. The land which was owned by the
corporation was its only asset, and this was held for the "sole purpose
of a favorable opportunity to sell to the government. "Corporation"
was merely a name which had been conferred upon an inactive
partnership.
A recent article in the YALE LAW JouaNAL suggested to the writer
the possible utility in bringing down to date the original article in
the MICHIGAN LAW REVIl~W on this subject and reviewing the decisions that have ·been handed down in the last decade.11 A majority
of these thirteen cases have seized upon the special fads doctrine
advanced by the Supreme Court of the United States as a means of
escape from the rigour of the general rule adhered to by the older
decisions. Fletcher, in his recent work on coqJorations, seems to
have been the first author to have recognized that there existed such
an exception to the general rule.12 This, however, is not at all due
10

Haverland v. Lane, 8g Wash. 557, 568.
"To make such an analysis, except as to cases decided since ~!)IO, would
indeed be a work of supererogation in view of Professor Wilgus' article."
Professor Clarence D: Laylin, 27 Y AI.~ L JouR. 731.
12
4 FJ.J;'tCHl'l!, CYCI.Ol'tDI~ OF CORPORATIONS, ( 1!)20) § § 2566, 2567.
21
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to the oversight of the older authorities, for his is the only exhaustive
work on the subject of corporations which has been published since
the decision in Strong v. Repide•
.It may be well to take up the cases in their chronological order,
for this method will better show the course of development of
the 'taw.
In February, 19n, the Court of Appeals of the District·of Columbia: handed down the decision in George v. Ford.13 Ford was a
manager and the director of the Beaty Lumber Company and held
five-sixths of the corporate stock. George held the other one-sixth
part of the stock. Ford represented to George that the affairs of
the company were in such a deplorable condition that it would be
necessary for the company to sell out to its competitor in order to
prevent dissolution. George then gave Ford a power of attorney to
sell his stock in the Beaty Lumber Company. Ford was a large
shareholder in the competitor at the time of this transaction. · He
purchased the George stock under the power of attorney and then
exchanged this together with all of his original holdings in the Beaty
Lumber Company for an equal number of shares in the competitor.
These shares Ford continued.to hold in his own ~ame. George later
.discovered that he had parted with his stock in the Beaty Lumber
Company at a mere fraction of its real value.
The case came up on the defendant's demurrer to the plaintiff's
bill for an accounting. The principal ground of demurrer was that
the facts alleged in the complaint did not state a cause for relief.
In overntling the demurrer, the court said: "That the defendant
was manager of the Beaty Lumber Company and the plaintiff a
director and shareholder thereof did not necessarily constitute such
a fiduciary relation between them· as would render the transaction of
December :z1, 1899, voidabie for that reason aion~. *'* *·But the
facts alleged, substantially, that the plaintiff, though a director, took
no active part in the management, and relied, as the defendant knew,
on him as manager and friend and fellow shareholder to keep bim informed of all matters relating to the operations and financial condition of the corporatibn. That under these circumstances, he sought
the plaintiff apparently to induce him to constitute the defendant his
·agent to sell and pass title to his stock and interests, would seem to
have imposed not only a moral but ari equitable obligation upon him,
11

George v. Ford, 36 App, Dist. Col. 315.
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when dealing with the plaintiff, to disclose to him the material facts
Of the Situation."H
Here, as in Strong v. Repide, Ford, as director, owned a majority
of the stock; he was the chief negotiator in the sale of the company's
assets; the sale was for the entire property of the corporation; and
he was acting as agent for the plaintiff in the sale of his stock. In
addition, the plaintiff and the defendant were the only shareholders
in the corporation. These are in brief the special facts upon which
the court rested its decision.
Now it is true that in the case of George v. Ford there was an
actual misrepresentation by the defendant, Ford, and this was relied
on by the court in rendering its opinion. However, in another part
of the opinion, the decision is rested upon the special facts enumerated above as creating a fiduciary relation between director and
shareholder, and this must at least be taken to have been a ratio
decidcndi.
Bawden v. Tay/or15 was decided by the Supreme Court of Illinois
in June, 1912. Taylor was the president and general manager of the
Taylor Publishing Company, pu1blishers of a scientific bulletin called
the Eagle. Taylor entered into negotiations with a publishing house
in New York City for the sale of the Eagle. Bawden, who was a
non-official shareholder in the Taylor Publishing Company, knew of
the pending negotiations, but was entirely dependent upon Taylor
for information.in regard to the price to be paid for the Eagle. Taylor·
bought Bawden's stock at a price that was somewhat below its actual
value, without disclosing the price to be paid by the New York firm
for the Eagle. The court_ refused to grant a rescission of the sale,
holding that the case fell within the general rule, that there is no duty
on the part of a director to disclose circumstances within his knmvledge affecting the value of the stock when buying the stock of a nonofficial shareholder. In this, they merely followed.the earlier Illinois
decision in Hooker v. Midland Steel and Iron Company. 18
In Bacon v. Soule, 17 July, 1912, the. California Court of Appeals
reached a like result. The plaintiff,· Bacon, and his two· sisters, defendants, were the only shareholders in the Bacon Land Company,
,. George v. Ford, 36 App. Dist. Col. 315, 328.
Bawden v. Taylor, 254 Ill. 464.
""Hooker v. Midland Steel and Iron Company, :?15 Ill. 444. Cf. 8 M'.icH.

u

L. IU:v. 286.
u

Bacon v. Soule, 19 Cal. App.

428.
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a corporation engaged in the real estate business. The two defendants were directors. For many years the plaintiff had taken little or
no interest in the affairs of the company. The shareholders decided
to dissolve the corporation and turn in their stock in exchange for
allotments in the land held by the company. The defendants demurred to the plaintiff's complaint for fraud and deceit, which
alleged that a certain house had been alloted to him under this agreement, that the value of the house had decreased greatly on account
of the removal of fixtures before the time of the agreement to dissolve, that he had no knowledge of the removal of the fixtures, but
believed that the house was in the same condition as it was when he
was actively engaged in the business of the corporation, and that,
although the defendants knew that he was acting under this belief,
they had failed to make any disclosure to him. The demurrer to the
complaint v;as sustained and the court reitera'ted the old rule that
there is no duty on the part of a director to disclose facts relative
to the management when dealing with a shareholder. However, if
there are any special facts in Bacon v. Soule, they would seem to
argue in favor of imposing no duty upon the director to disclose
rather in support of the principle recognized in Strong v. Repide.
"In the case at bar," the court remarks, "it is apparent that in dealing with the subject-matter of the controversy the defendants were
not acting in any manner as the representatives of. the corporation. ·
On the contrary, they, as individuals, were dealing with the plaintiff
'3.s an individual in a transaction purely personal to each of them, and
therefore, their respective duties and obligatioQs to one another must
be measured by the ordinary rules regarding transactions between
individuals rather than by those which pertain to and govern the
conduct of officers of a corporation in the management and control
of the corporation's affairs and property."18
In Gadsden v. Bennetto,1 9 March, 1913, Gadsden was the owner
of two shares of stock in the Kooteney Valley Fruit Lands Company, a corporation organized for the sole purpose of holding a tract
of fruit lands with the view to a future advantageous sale. The
two defendants were directors and officers of the company. Bennetto, one of the defendants, entered into negotiations for the sale
of the <:ompany's holdings and secured an offer of $8o,ooo. The
,,. Bacc.1 v. Soule, 19 Cal. App. 428, 438.
Gadsden v. Bcnnetto, 23 Manitoba L. Rep. 33, 9 Dom. L. Rep. 719, reversing, 21 West. L. Rep. 886, S Dom. L. Rep. 529u
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defendants, as directors, knowing of the offer, passed a resolution
appointing themselves a committee to bring in proposals for the sale
of the company's property. They then bought in Gadsden's stock at
$1,370 per share without disclosing to him the $8o,ooo offer. The
committee then brought in a proposal to accept the offer, the lands
were sold, and the price received raised the sh,are value of the stock
to $2,000. The proceeding was in the nature of a bill in equity to
have the defendants declared trustees of the profits realized on
Gadsden's stock.
In granting relief, Perdue, J. A., at pages 39 and 40 of the Manitoba Report distinguishes the case from the earlier English decision,
which declared that there was no. fiduciary relation between director
and shareholder:
"The position of the members of the committee is very different from ordinary directors of a company as regards their
fiduciary relations, and is quite distinguishable from Percival
v. Wright~ (1902] 2 Ch. 421. In the present case the com;mittee were acting outside the ordinary duties of directors,
they were appointed for the purpose of securing and bringing
in a proposal for disposing, not only of the land which was
the property of the Company, but the shares which were the
property of the individual shareholders. On any proposal
being received by them which involved the acquisition of the
shares, they were bound to disclose to the shareholders, the
interested parties, the natux:e of the proposal and the price
offered. If the proposal took the form of acquiring all the
Company's property and leaving the shares out of ~ccount,
the shareholders would be immediately interested in that proposal because their shares would become worthless when the
property was transferred and they could only look for reimbursement to their share of the purchase money on a distribution being made. If the committee, acting under its duties
to the Company and the shareholders secured a highly advantageous offer, they were bound to make a full disclosure- of
the offer to the Company and the shareholders. The members of the committee were the confidential agents of the
Company and the shareholders. Their concealment of Cooper's offer, which so greatly enhanced tlie value of the shares,
with a scheme in view tp buy the shares at a low price, was
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a breach of duty and a fraud upon the shareholders whose
shares they acquired by means of that concealment, at a price
far less than their intrinsic value.
"The learned trial judge dealt with the case as if Bennetto
and Wellband were mere directors of the Company and gave
his decision upon the view that, as directors, no duty was cast
upon them to make to the individual ·shareholders full disclosure of the negotiations that were pending with Cooper.
"Without expressing any opinion on the duty of directors
to the individual shareholders in i;;uch a case, I think the
learned trial Judge quite overlooked the fact that the three
members of the committee were, by reason of the resolution
appointing them, and by their acceptance of the duty imposed
by it upon them, acting outside the scope of ordinary di·
rectors, and that a fiduciary relatfonship had been established
between them, on the one hand, and the Company and the
individual shareholders on the other."
In Black v. Simpson, 20 April, 1913, the defendant, Simpson, was
a director and the general manager of the Farmers' Fertilizer Company, in which the plaintiffs were shareholders. Simpson conceived
and entered upon a scheme of acquiring the entire stock of the Company at much less than its actual value 'by representing to each of the
plaintiffs that the corporation was not prosperous. He successfully
carried out this plan, and thereby induced the_plaintiffs and other
shareholders to sell to him their holdings in the corporation at a
price greatly under the real value. He then made a considerable
profit on the transactions by the sale of the entire corp0rate assets.
The South Carolina court compelled Simpson to account for ~he
profits to the shareholders from whom he had purchased.
It is true that in Black v. Simpson there were actual misrepresentations made by the director· for the purpose of inducing the shareholders to sell their stock. But inasmuch as the court elected to rest
their decision not upon the ground of actual fraud, but rather upol!
the breach of the 'fiduciary or quasi-trust relation between the director and the individual shareholders, the latter ground must be
taken to be the real basis for the decision. It will be Jtoticed that in
Black v. Simpson there was a general scheme to induce the sale of
the shares at less than their real value ; and, during the course of the
•Black v. Simpson, 94 S. C.
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opinion, Justice Woods singles out this fact as a reason for the existence of the quasi-trust relation between the director and shareholder.
The special facts doctrine was again advanced in the case of Allen
v. Hyatt. 20• Here again, as in Gadsden v. Bennetto, 21 the court distinguish~d the earlier decision in Percival v. Wright. 21 • The plaintiffs w~re ·non-official shareholders in the Lakeside Canning Company, Ltd. The defendants were directors and held $10,000 out of
the capital stock of $30,500. During the time that negotiations were
pending for- the sale of the entire corporate property to the Dominion
Canners, Ltd., in furtherance of a proposed amalgamation of all the
canning companies in Canada, the directors approached. the plaintiffs
and secured options on their stock at $250 a share without disclosing
to them the price to be paid by the Dominion Company. The options
were exercised and the sale of the corporate property of the Lakeside company was completed with a handsome profit resulting to the
defendants on the plaintiffs' shares of stock. The Supreme Court
of Canada held that the directors should hold the profits as trustees
for the shareholders. Speaking for the Court, Haldane, L. C., said:
"The appellants appear to have 1been under the impression
that the directors of a company are entitled under all circumstances to act as though they owed no duty to individual
shareholders. No doubt the duty of the directors is primarily
one to the eompany itself. It may be that in circumstances
such as those of Percival v. Wright [1902] 2 Ch. 421, which
was relied on in the argument, they can deal at arm's length
with a shareholder. But the facts, as found in the present
case, are widely different from those in Perci'l:al v. Wright,
and their Lordships think that the directors must be taken to
have held themselves out to the individual shareholders as
acting for them on the same footing as they were acting for
the company itself, that is as agents." 22
The case of Steinfield v. Nielsen,2 3 commented on in the previous
""•Allen v. Hyatt, 30 Times L. Rep. 444, affirming, 17 Dom. L. Rep. 7.
affirming 8 Dom. L. Rep. 79. which affirmed, 20 Ont. W. Rep. 594. 3 Ont. W.
N. 370, which affirmed, ro Ont. W. Rep. 850, 2 Ont. W. N. <)27.
21
Gadsden v. Bennetto, supra, note 19.
~Percival v. Wright, [1902] 2 Ch. 421. Cf. 8 MrcH. L. Rsv. :z8r•
... Allen v. Hyatt, 17 D. L. R 7, II .
., Steinfeld v. Nielsen, 12 Ariz. 381.
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article in the M1c111GAN LAW REvIEw, 24 was subsequently carried to
the Supreme Court of the United States on appeal,-A.rizona at that
time being a territory. The Supreme -Court refused to ,consider the
case on its merits because the court of the territory had failed to find
the facts in the nature of a special verdict, as requ1red by law. The
case was therefore reversed, the reversal to ''.have the legal effect of
causing the case to be as though it were yet pending undetermined on
the appeal from the trial court.~• 2 :i The case of Steinfeld v. Nielsen.
in 12 Arizona, therefore, must be consid~red as mere nullity so far
as its authoritative value is concerned.
The case again came before the Supreme Court o'f Arizona and was
finally decided by that court in April, 1914,-Arizona then having
been admitted as a state.:a To revie\v the facts of the case briefly,
Steinfeld, though not a director, was the owner.of the majority of the.
stock, and, in the words of the court, "Steinfeld's domination of the
company was absolute." Nielsen was a director. and the superintendent of the company's mine. Steinfeld conceived the idea of purchasing adjacent mines with the object of thus increasing the value of the
entire group of mines in order that the entire group might be sold at
a more favorable price. With thi~ in view, and also for the purpose
of acquiring the Nielsen stock at a nominal price, he caused the mine
to be shut down and discharged Nielsen from the board of directors
and his position as superintendent of the mine-. The adjacent mines
were bought in at a low figure and so was Nielsen's stock. The whole
property was then sold at such a price that, in consideration of the
probability of such a sale, Nielsen's stock was actually worth twice
:e price that Steinfeld had paid for it.
Justice Ross, in rendering th!! opinion of the court, first stated the
general rule as to the·relation between director and shareholder.
then averted to the case of Strong v. Repide and set out at length the
doctrine of special facts in that case. "We would be bound by that
case," reads the opinioH, "if the facts in this case were the same. In
that case Strong was not an officer of the company and had no pirt
in. its management, and the sale to the government was entirely in
Repide's charge and pending at the time he bought the Strong shares.

a

He

"8 M1cH. L. Rsv. 290.
""Steinfeld v. Nielsen, 224 U. S. 534, 540, 32 Sup. Ct: Rep. 6og, 612, 56
L. Ed. 872.
•Steinfeld v. Nielsen, 15 Ariz. 424, 139 Pac. 879.
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Nielsen was·not only a·stockholder in the Nielsen Mining & Sm~lting
Company, but was also a director. H~ was also superintendent of
the mines .and smelter. * * * Under these -circumstances, there were
no special facts known to Steinfeld that were not also known to
Nielsen." 27
There were no special facts in the case of Shaw v. Cole Manufactziring Company, 28 April, 1915, and consequently the case followed
the general rule that the director is not liable to the shareholder for
failure to disclose facts relative to the c.ondition of the company
when purchasing his stock. In this case, tbe Coles purchased from
the Shaws at ~ price greatly under the real value, without informing
the Shaws of facts relative to the condition of the company, which
facts did not appear in the company's books. In arriving at their
decision, the court followed the former Tennessee case .of Deaderick
v. Wilson.~ 0 .However, they felt constrained-to refer to the decision
of Strong v. Repide and pointed out two special facts in that case
which were not present in the case at bar, namely, the ~xtensive information of the managing director, and the director's concealment
of the fact that he was the real purchaser of the stock.80
Haverland v. Lane,31 decided by the Supreme·Court of Washington in February, 1916, also held according to the general rule. The
plaintiff was a shareholder in the Consolidated Telephone Company,
and the defendant was a director of that company. 'fhe company
was in hard circumstan~es and no dividends had been .declared for
a.number of years. The defendant negotiated a loan by the terms
of which he was to transfer to the Securities Company a· number of
the shares of the C•;msolidated Telephone Company as security.
Without telling the plaintiff of the loan, he bought the plaintiff's
shares and transferred them to the Security Company. Subsequently
there was a rise in the value of the stock of the Consolidated
Company.
In distinguishing the case from Strong v. Rcpide, the· coµrt said:
"In that case there was an inactive corporation. It was no
"' Steinfeld v. Nielsen, IS Ariz. 424, 445, 4¢.
"Shaw v. Cole Manufa~turlng Company, I32 Tenn. 2IO.
"Deaderick v. Wilson, 8 Bruct. (Tenn.) I08. See note 4, supra.
also, 8 MICH. L. REv. ;276.
•Shaw v. Cole Manufacturing Company, IJ2 Tenn. 2IO, 2I411 Haverland v. Lane, 8g Wash. 557, IS4 Pac. III8.
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more than a name. * * * The _principal owner because of his.
large controlling_ interest had been ~onsulted and knew tliat
the lands might be sold for a price to be agreed upon; that a
large sum of money had been offered by the government. He
did not go to the complaining stockholder or to her agent,
although he knew him. * * * Every effort was made to conceal the prospective sale of the lands, and the immediate purcliaser of the stock."32

In _the case at bar the court pointed out that there were no special
facts. There was no effort on the part of the director to conceal his
identity, nor was there anything unusual about the nature 9f the
corporation itself. Hence, the general rule as announced in the
e.arlier Washington case of O'Ncilp v. Tenzes 33 was followed and
the director was sustained in his defense to an action for deceit by
the shareholder.
1n Jacquith v. Mason, 3 ' March, 1914, the plaintiff. owned· 201
shares of stock in the Underwriters Insurance Company. No dividends had been declared on this stock for several years. The president of the company bought in the plaintiff's stock at $75 per share
without informing her that negotiations for the sale of. all the company's assets had practically been closed. The final consummation
of the deal caused .the stock of the Un!'.lenvriters Company to jump
to $110 per share.
The court did not attempt to find any special facts in their opinion,
but held that the defendant's liability rested upon the rule that in
all cases regardless of the. circµmstances there is a relation of trust
between' director and individual shareholder as to the latter's .shares
of stock, and that the directo~,' in purchasing the shares of a nonofficial shareholder, o'ves a duty to disclose. This view was first
advanced in Oli7.'er v. Oliver3G and followed in Stewart v. Harris. 88
The same ·rule was again followed in the recent Iowa case of
Dawson v. National Life Insurance. Company,37 which was decided
"Haverland v. Lane, 8g Wash. 557, 568.
a: O'Neile v. Ternes, 32 Wash. 528. See note 4, supra. Cf. also 8 MICH.
L. Rr:v. 283.
04
Jacquith v. Mason, 99 Neb. 50915 Oliver v. Oliver, II8 Ga. 362.
Cf. 8 MICH. L. REV. 286.
.. Stewart v. Harris, 6g Kan .. 4g8. Cf. 8 M1cH. L. Rr:v. 286.
11
Dawson v. National Life Insurance Company, I76 Iowa 362.
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in May, 1916. The defendants ·were directors and officers of the
Des Moines Insurance Company. The plaintiff, Dawson, held _three
shares of the com_pany's stock. An agreement was concluded between the defendants and the National Life Insurance Company by
which the latter was to purchase all the stock of the Des Moines
Insurance Company. According to the terms of the agr~ement,
Harbac.h, one of the defendants, who was also an officer of the National Company, was to purchase the stock of all the small shareholders of the Des Moines Insurance Company for the purpose of
later transferring them to the National Insurance Company. Harbach bought the plaintiff's stock at $200 per share without disclosing
to him the existence of the contract with the National Company or
any of its terms. The average price which the defendant's received
for their own shares when they were transferred to the National Insurance Company was about $1,000.
Here too the court laid down in bold terms the doctrine that the
fiduciary relation between director and shareholder does not rest on
any specful facts, ·nor did the court search for any. Justice Ladd
commented on the decision in Strong v. Repidf! in the following
manner:
"That the writer of. the opinion in Stro'ng's case was mistaken in saying that the decisions were -based on special facts
which took them out of the general rule clearly appears from
·our quotation from the Georgia case38 and the language of
the instruction in the Kansas case.' 139
The facts, as set out in the opinion in Poole v. Camden,~ decided
in November, 1916, are rather meager. However, it is clear that
the plaintiff was a non-official shareholder and the defendant, Camden, was a director in the Interurban Railway Company. The plaintiff called on Camden and asked to be advised as to the .value of her
·'stock and the condition of the corporation, but Camden told het
nothing. Camden then bought the plaintiff's stock at less than its
real value. 'fhe lower court decreed that the sale be set aside and
the- defendant account to the plaintiff for such dividends as he had
received on the stock subsequent to its sale by the plaihtiff, and this
decree was affirmed in the supreme court.
.. Oliver v. Oliver, u8 Ga. 362.
11
Stewart v. Harris, 69 Kan. 498.
.. Poole v. Camden, 79 W. V. 310.
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The basis for the decision is to 'he found on page· 31g of the report, where Judge Lynch says:
"Conceding the so-called majority rule to be the correct
one, we think, _upon the principles of the cases just referred
to, recognizingthe exceptions, that where a stockholder, who,
as in this case, is first sought °l?Y a secret agent of a director,
with a proposition to buy his stock, and the stockholder goes
to Sl;lch director to obtain full information respecting the
value of his stock and the condition of the corporation, its
plans and prospects, the reason for a recent reductioµ of
dividends, and all other information affecting or tending to
affect the valu~ of the stock, such director cannot withhold
any information 'Within his knowiedgc, or in any way mislead or deceive him, or by acts, words, or conduct, induce a
sale of the stock to him, except upon penalty of having the
s~le rescinded at the option of the stockholder; that if he
undertakes to speak ·01: ·b~come active in inducing the sale
he must speak fully, frankly, and honestly, and conceal nothing to the disadvantage of the selling stockholder."
The case which most clearly marks out the development of the
special facts doctrine is Bollstrom v. l)uple,,; P011.;er Car Co~pany,41
decided by the Supreme Court of Michigan in· December, 1919.
Bollstrom owned 1,161 shares of stock in the Duplex ~ower Car
Compaey in which bOth Murray and Town were directors and To~n
was also the majority stockholder. Ever since the organization of
the company in 1909 it had been in deplorable financial condition.
No dividends had been declared, and assessments had been levied
against the sto.ck to meet the'claims of creditors. At times the stbck,
which had a par value of ten dollars, was not actually worth ten
cents on the dollar. In 1916, Town· entered into an agreement with
Lansing capitalists under which they were to 'buy three-fourths of
the stock of the Duplex Power Car Company and transfer the stock
to a syndicate which they agreed to incorporate. The syndicate was
to _pay twenty dollars a share for _the.stock received from the Duplex
Cc;impany. With full knowledge of th~s agreement and in furtherance thereof, Murray purchased the plaintiff's shares at the par value
of ten dollars. Bollstron:i had no knowledge of the agreei:nent' and
"·Bollstrom v. Duplex Power Car Company, :2081_fich. 15, 175 N. W. 492.
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had ·been inactive in the affairs of the Duplex Power Car Company
for some time. It was held that Bollstrom was entitled in equity to
the difference between the sale price and the real value of the shares
at the time of the sale.
·· J1,1stice Sharp~, in his opinion, proceeds to distinguish the former
Michigan case, Walsh v. Goulden/ 2 which had held that there was
no.duty on the part of the purchasing director tp disclose facts relative fo the condition of the corporation to the shareholder. Referring to that decision, he says :
"As applied to a going concern, whose records reveal the
value of the stock, and the good will and intangible a;ssets of
wl;ich are presumably as well known ·to one shareholder as to
another, there may be no hardship in so holding. But the
proo.fs in this case present a different situation."
A11d again:
"We thirik the facts in this case bring it squarely within
the rule laid dO\yn in Strong v. Repide. In that case, the
president of a corporation purchased stock at much less than
its par (real?) value, as known to him, and, due to conditions,
unknown to the stockholders."
By. merely counting 1,1oses, it will be found that since 19ro eight
cases':i have imposed a ·liability in. one form .or another upon the
director for failure to .disclose; while. there are but five cases" which
take the view that there is no liability. This would seem to disclose
a marked departure-from the settled law before that time. However,
mere numerical weight is a rather unsatisfactory and superficial
method of arriving at.the true state of the iaw.
Of the. five cases deciding that there is no liability, three followed
the general rule laid down. in former cases in. the same state, hut
"Walsh v. Goulden, 130 Mich. 531, 90' N. W. 4o6. Cf. J)Ote 4, supra, and
also 8 MICH. L. Rtv. 282.
·
"'George v. -ford, 36 App. Dist. Col. 315; Black ·v. Simpson, 94 S. C. 312;
Allen v. Hya~t. 17 D. L. R. 7; Jacquith v. Mason, 99 ·Neb. 509; Dawson v.
National Life Insurance Company, "176 Iowa 362; Poole v. Camden, 79 W.
V. 310; Bollstrom v. Duplex Power Car C6mpanv, 208 Mich. is, 175 N. W.
492; Gadsden v. Bennette, 23 Man!toba L. Rep. 33, 9 D. L. R. 719.
.. Bawden v. Taylor, 254 Ill. 464; Bacon v. Soule, 19 Cal. App. 428;
Steinfeld v. Nielsen, 15 Ariz. 424; Shaw v. Cole Manufacturing Company, 132
Tenn. 2101 Haverland v. Lane, 8g Wash. 557.
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also declared that they were unable to find any special facts in the
case.4 ;; In another of these cases, the court expressed a willingiiess
to be bound by the ntle in Strong v. Repide, but decided that they
could not apply the. rule in the case at bar inasmuch as the pl~intiff
was a director and was therefore on an equal footing with the defendant. 411 ·The fifth case in this group declared that the relation of
shareholder and director {vas not involved and th~t t}\e parties to the
cause were dealing as any other individuals. 47 In fact, there is not
one jurisdiction where the question has before been undecided that
has expressed a willingness to follow the general rule as laid down
by the older line of authorities. 48
Six of the eight cases imposing a· liability upon tqe purchasing·
director have admitted that in general there is no fiduciary relatio~
between director and individual shareholder, but have found .facts
sufficient to take the instant case out of the operation ·of the· general
rule.49 It seems that if the director sends a secret agent to the shareholder for ,the purpose of purchasing his stock and ·the shareholder
then comes to the director for further information, the director is
bound to reveal all facts within his knowledge relative to the prob:
able future value of the stock.~0 A like duty will result ff the di-·
rector, in furtherance of a preconceived plan to buy in all the stock
of the corporation, takes active steps to deceive the shareholders 'as
to the real value o.f their stock.51 ·The writer submits that such cases
could more properly .be· decided on the ground of actual fraud than
upon ahy relation between shareholder and dire~or. 52 And like" Bawden v. Taylor, .254 Ill. 4>4. following, Hooker v. Midland Steel &
Iron Company, 215 Ill. 444; Shaw v. Cole Manufacturing Company, 132 Tenn.
210, following, Deaderick v. Wilson, 8 Baxt. (Tenn.) 1o8; and, Haverland v.
Lane; 89 Wash. 557, following, O'Neile v. Ternes, 32 Wash. 528.
.. Steinfeld v. Nielsen, 15 Ariz. 424;
·
·
., Bacon v. Soule, 19 Cal. App. 428.
•• See note 4, supra.
·
·
" George v. Ford, 36 App. Dist. Col. 315; Black v. Simpson, 94 S. Car.
312; Gadsden v. Bennetto, 23 Manitoba L. Rep. 33; Allen v. Hyatt, 17 Dom. L.
Rep. 7; Poole
Camden, 79 W. V. 310; Bollstrom v. Duplex.~ower Car
Company, :zo8 Mich. 15, 175 N. W. 492•
.. Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419; Poole v. Camden,."79 \V. V. 310; Bollstrom v. Duplex Power Car Company. :zo8 Mich. 15, 175 N. W. 492, (although
this point was not noted in the opinion).
.
·
01
Black v. Simpson, 94 S. Car. 312;, Strong v. Repide, 213 U. S. 419.
02
Traer v. Clewes, II5· U. S. 528, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 155, 29 i.."Ed. 4)7;
Morrison v. Snow, z6 Utah 247, 72 Pac. 924.
·

v.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

wise, the intentional concealment by a director of the fact that he is
the real purchaser would warrant a finding of actual fraud. 53 But
curiously enough, several of the courts se~m to have been so impressed with the opportunity to find exceptions to ·the old rule that
they entirely overlooked 'the elements of actual fraud in the case. 5'
The fact that the director first sought out the shareholder for the
purpose of buying his stock has frequently been made the basis for
finding an exception.55
The nature of the corporation itself has been seized upon by a
number of the ·courts for this purpose. For example, in the case of
a "closed" corporation wher.e the buyer and seller of the stock are
the. only shareholders, courts have invariably held that a fiduciary
relation existed between them56 and have held transfers of stock
under such circumstan~es . to the same standard of good faith as
transactions b~ween· partners.57 And this seems to be the correct
result; for 'although the relation be~ween shareholder and, directo~ is
not generally so intimate· as that. between partners, still, as. a matter
of common experience, there i~ tio essential differep.ce between a
dosed corporation with but few shareholders anct the ordinary partnership except the mere fact of -incorporation. If the corporation is
.inactive-not a going concern-SQ that the shareholders have no
opportunity to ~cquaint themselves with the facts by an inspection
of the company's books, this has been held t6 place the director in su~h an unusual po$ition of superiority in dealing with the shareliolder that he is bottnd to make a disclosure. 511 And likewise, where
the purchasing director is the majority stockholder, his natural superiority ovei: the shareholder is coupled with a duty to disclose. 59
George v. Ford, 36 App. Dist. Col.·315; Poole v. Camden, 79 W. V. 310;
Bollstroni. v. Duplex Power Car Company, 208 Mich. fS, 175 N. W. 492;
Strong v. Repide, 213 U. S. 419.
.
"'·Poole v.-Camden, 79 W. V. 310;. Bollstrom v. Duplex Power Car Company. 208 ~fich. 15; Strong v. Repide, 213 .U. S. 41g.
u George v.- Ford, 36 App. Dist. Col. 315; Gadsden v. Bennetto, 23 Manitoba L. Rep. 33, 9 Dom. L'. Rep. 719; Allen v. Hyatt, 17 Dom. L. Rep. 7;
Poole v. Cam4en, 79 W. V. 310; Stt6ng v. Repide, 213 U. S. 419:"
. ..George v. Ford, 36 App. Dist. Col. 315; Gadsden v. Bennett9, 23 Man.
L. Rep. 33; Strong v. Repide, 213 U. S. 419.
.
_
.,. Griffith v. Owen, .[1907] 1 Ch. 195;' Andei:son v. Lemon, 4 Seid. (N.
Y.) 23,6.
a Bollstroril. v..Duplex Power Car C~mpany, 208 Mich. 15; Strong v~
~epide; 213
419, •
I
'
• •George v. For<J, 3§ App. Dist. Col. 315; Strong Repide, 213 U. S. 419.
11
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STOCK PURCHASES BY DIRECTORS

If the undisclosed fact consists of a single transactic;m which will
naturally cause a rise in the value of the stock, such as sale of the
entire corporate property at aq. advantageous price, the director is
bound to disclose this fact- before he can safely buy in shares.60
Here too the director is. in a position which, by reason of his peculiar
knowledge, is paturally ·superior to that of the shareho~der, and the
transaction, is one which the shareholder could not possibly discover
through any other oracle than his director.
. If the relation ;of principal and agent exists between the shareholder and the purchasing director, it has been held that there is a
fiduciary relation between them,-for example, where the ·shareholder gives the director a power of attorney to sell his stock.61 But
.such cases could have been decided qn the ground of agency alone
and without' reference to the relation of shareholder .and director,
for there is alw~ys a fiduciary relation between principal and agent. 62
However, the recent decisions :with one accord liave heralded the
additional el~ment of agency as an exception to the general rule relating to dealing~ between director and ·shareholder. And one case
seems to have gone so far to find some basis for takrng the case out
of the general rule-that agenc-1 was found where 'in fact no agency
existed.63 The reasoning of, the court was that, although the directors in their capacity' as such are not the agents of the ·individual
shareholders, still, if they appoint themselves a committee to bring
in proposals 'for the transfer of the !=ompany's entire property, they
are the agents of the individual shareholders in this respect. Now,
accepting the. court's hypothesis, that there is no rela.tion of principal
and· agent '~tween director and shareh_older, the mere act of the
directors. in appointing themselves agents could not have had that
effect ipso facto. It is one of the cardinal principles of agency that
the relation can exist only at the will and by the act of the principat 64
..•George v. Ford, 36 App. Dist. Col. 315; Allen. v. Hyatt, 17 Dom. L .. Rep.
7; Gadsden v. Bennetto, 23 Manitoba L. Rep. 33; Strong v. Repide, 213 U.

s. 419.

.
.
.
.
' ~George v". Ford, 36 App. Dist. Col. 315; Allen v. Hyatt, 17 Dom. L. ·
Rep. 7.
12
Kimball v. Ranney, 122 Mich. 100, '8o Amer. St. Rep. 548, 46 L. R. A.
403, 8o N. W. 992.
.
.
• Gadsden v. Bennetto, 23 Manitoba L. Rep. 33, 9 Dom. L. Rep. 719.
"' I .MECHEM, AGENCY, [Ed. 2] § 210; Pole v. Leask, 33. L. J. Eq. 155; McGoldrick v. Willits, 52 N. Y. 612.
·
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The report of the. case discloses no act on the part of the shareholders~ as principals, from which it could· be inferred that they
appointed the committee of directors their own agents. Nor could
any agency be established through the acquiescence of the shareholders05 in the acts of the committee, for it affirmatively appears
that the shareholders did not even know of the existence of the committee before' parting with their s_hares.
A fair inference from the foregoing discussion would seem to be
that the recent decisions show a marked tendency coupled with a
desire to break away· from the old rule that the purchasing director
owes no duty to disclose. The rule seems to be wearing-away under
the pracess of judicia'l decision in the same manner as many other
of the more arbitrary rules of the common law.88
No doubt, the· doctrine of special "facts has led to just results in
the individual cases decided under it. However, it leac1co to uncertainty in the i~w. It is as essential that law should be certain as that
it should be flexible and just in individual cases.87 To correlate all
the special facts into one fundamental principle upon which all cases
could be determined would seem to be an impossible task. Perhaps
no mgre definite principle can be devised than that advanced by
Pomeroy 68 and Perry69 as the fundamental guide post for all cases
.. l M£cHEM, A~NCY, [Ed. 2] § 28g; Fowlds v. Evans, 52 Minn. 551 •
.. For exampleS; see, Rylands v. Fletcher, L. R. 3 H. L. 330, distinguished
by Nichols v. Marsland, L. R. 2 Ex. Div. l ; Box v. Jubb, L. R. 4 Ex. Div. 76;
and also, Festing v. Allen, 12 Mees. & W. 279, distinguished by Astley v.
...{icklethwait, 15 Ch. Div. 59-

.., "Optima est lex, quae minimum relinquit arbitrio judirias; optimus
j11dex, qui minimum sibi." BACON, APHORISMS, 46; l K£NT, COMM. 475-8; I
BLACKSTON£, Co:nM. 62.
.. "Whenever two persons stand in such relation that, while it continues,
confidence is reposed by one, and the influence which necessarily grows out
of that confidence is possessed by the other, and this confidence is abused, or
the· influence is exerted to obtain an advantage .at the expense of the confiding
party, •he person so availing himself of his position will not be permitted to
retain the advantage, ~lthough the transaction could not have been impeached
if no such confidential relation had existed." 2 POM£ROY EQ. JuR ..[Ed. 4]. §
956; Keith v. Kellam, 35 Fed. 243, 246. ·
.. "Whenever two persons stand in such relation that confidence is necessarily reposed by one, and the influence necessarily growing out of that fact
is possessed by· the other, and this confidence is abused or the influence is
exerted ·to obtain an advantage at the expense of the confiding party, the party
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involving fiduciary relationships. But this is admittedly 011e of the
most ill-defined and elastic principles of the law. 70 To decide questions involving the duty of the purchasing director on the basis of
any such rule would, therefore, seem to be relegating the determination of whether or not there is a fiduciary relation to_ the domain of
fact by severing from the case all consideration of the.leg-c1.l relation
o.f shareholder and director. There is clearly as much· reason for
well-defined rules in the transfer and sale of stock as there is in the
case of negotiable instruments. The majority of the courts, therefore, seem to be confronted with this interesting dilemma: By clinging to the old rule that there is no fiduciary relation between director
and shareholder, they have a clearly defined rule which leads to unjust results in the great majority of cases where it is applied; by
finding exceptions to this rule and following the special facts doctrine, they may reach just results in individual cases, but clearness
and precision in the law are sacrificed.
In view of the foregoing discussion, the writer submits that only
two of the recent decisions have followed the correct principle71 by
following the lead of the earlier Georgia72 and Kansas7 :i decisions.
Both confusion and injustice seem to be avoided by starting. with
the premise that there is always a fiduciary relation between director
and sl;iareholder74 in the purchase by the director Of the. shareholder's stock.
'

University of MiCliigan· Law School.
so availing himself of his position will n_Q.t be permitted to retain the advantage." I PERRY, TRUSTS, [Ed. 5] § 209; Bohm v. Bohm, 9 Col. rno:
'""Courts of equity have carefully refrained from defining the particular
instances of fiduciary relations in such manner that other ~d perhaps new
cases might be excluded."· 2 PoM£ROY, EQ. JuR. [Ed. 4] § 957.
n Jacquith v. Mason, 99 Neb. 509; Dawson v. National Life Insurance
Company, "176 Iowa 362.
"Oliver v. Oliver, u8 Ga. 362.
" Stewart v. Harris, 6g Kan. 498.
"That the fiction of the corporate entity will not stand in the way of
such a principle, see, ZJ YALE L. JouR. 731.

